Abstract. A discursive approach to technological innovation recognises that scientific and technical innovations are the products of groups of people. The subject of this paper is how this insight from the sociology of scientific knowledge can make a contribution to debates in economic geography. Principally drawing on the work of social constructionists, this approach is used to provide insights into the reasons for both the creation and the maintenance of the geographical agglomeration of small firms constituted by the British motor-sport industry.
Introduction
The 'cultural turn' is beginning to have an important impact upon economic geography through a growing recognition of the discursive aspects of industrial organisation. In the context of so-called 'new industrial spaces'-new geographical agglomerations of firms-this has meant a shift away from explanations based on quantitative indices of material inputs and outputs and a shift towards explanations based on qualitative indices of information flows (Asheim and Dunford, 1997; Storper, 1995; Thrift, 1994; Thrift and Olds, 1996) . In this paper we illustrate the advantages that derive from a discursive approach for understanding one of the key features of many new industrial spaces-technological innovation. In the first section of the paper we provide an illustration of how a discursive approach to technological innovation can be used. In the second section we discuss some of the insights this perspective can provide for understanding the agglomeration of firms.
The empirical context for the discussion is the British motor-sport industry (BMSI)-the world's leading industrial agglomeration for the design and assembly of single-seater racing cars. This industry consists of scores of small firms clustered in a 50 mile radius around Oxfordshire in southern England, in what has become known as 'Motor-Sport Valley' (see Henry et al, 1996; Pinch et al, 1997 , for maps of the region). Around threequarters of all the single-seater racing cars used throughout the world originate from this relatively small area, with, for example, virtually all the world's leading Formula One and Indycar racing cars designed and assembled in the region.
The empirical analysis is based upon an eighteen-month study of the BMSI. In-depth semistructured interviews were undertaken with over fifty senior managers, designers, arid engineers in all the leading firms in the industry, and these interviews were combined with an analysis of archival and published material on the industry.
A discursive approach to technological innovation A discursive approach to technological innovation draws upon a number of recent developments in the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) (Collins and Pinch, 1994; Latour, 1987; Latour and Woolgar, 1979 ; Lynch and Woolgar, 1990; Woolgar, 1993) . Although this is a highly diverse set of literature, an underlying theme in this work is a rejection of a mimetic approach which views knowledge as a mirror held to reflect an external, objective reality. Instead, knowledge is seen as a malleable social construct formulated by groups of people.
It follows from this social constructionist approach that the acceptance or rejection of particular scientific theories or technological innovations is to be explained primarily in the social, rather than the natural, world. In the early days of a scientific theory or technological innovation there is typically a great deal of uncertainty about the meaning or the utility of the new development. This has been termed the period of interpretative flexibility . However, technical and scientific communities gradually form a consensus about the meaning of the new developments and what is termed social closure takes place. Central to this process of social closure is the forging of discourses (shared sets of meanings). A discursive approach therefore rejects the view that there is some underlying natural logic to the world waiting to reveal itself. It is not the inherent theoretical rigour or the inherent utility of innovations that leads to this closure so much as the acceptability of the innovations to powerful social groupings, such as scientists, politicians, and economic interests. It is argued that because of these social influences, 'radically new' innovations often emerge in obscure places outside of the mainstream centres of thinking where they may be neglected for many years.
This social constructionist approach (sometimes called the 'strong' version of SSK) attempts to avoid technological determinism, in which technology is envisaged as a 'thing' out there which impinges upon society in an independent fashion. This is not to say, however, that there is not a role for 'the material' or materiality. The crucial point is that the material and discursive are intimately bound together.
(1)
For the purposes of this paper, the notion that the material and discursive are intimately bound together is taken as the given message. We focus instead on the work of social constructionists to deliver the insights of a (social) discursive approach to technological innovation and, in turn, how SSK can make a contribution to debates in economic geography (in this case about localised production complexes). In the following sections we draw on the insights of the social constructionist approach to analyse technological innovation within the motor-sport industry. It is important at the outset to appreciate that innovation is crucial for survival in the highly competitive world of motor racing. Within the limits of the regulations which govern the various racing formulae, a continual process of innovation has to be undertaken. It is sometimes claimed that because of this continual striving for improvements, last season's racing cars are little more than museum pieces. Thus, each racing season, new versions of the cars are introduced. However, unless last season's car was completely uncompetitive, or the regulations have changed dramatically, these designs will tend to be heavily based upon previous designs. (I) Thus, recent debates in SSK are less about the relative 'weightings' given to 'the social' vis-a-vis 'the material' and more about how you initially construct (avoid) the social/material dualism (Bingham, 1996 ; see also Murdoch, 1997) . Social constructivism is still argued to be asymmetrical by proponents of an alternative approach within SSK, known as actor network theory (ANT). ANT, amongst other issues, gives much greater emphasis to material elements. However, it purports to do so through a nondeterministic (and symmetrical) manner. According to Callon (1980; and Latour (1987; 1988; , for example, although scientists attempt to write the script of their experiments, these material elements also have their part to play and, to extend the metaphor, in a sense write their own lines (see also Law, 1992a; Law and Mol, 1995) . Thus, this approach recognises that social relations may shape machines but that machines may also shape social relations (although this point would be put in a rather different language; see Murdoch, 1997) . Which of these directions is most appropriate is deemed a matter for empirical investigation. The ANT approach has aroused enormous controversy; for example it has been accused of bringing back the realism and technological determinism that SSK attempted to avoid (for example, Hinchcliffe, 1996; Koch, 1995) .
The 'seamless web' of society and technology The first, and perhaps the most important, lesson to be drawn from the literature on SSK is that technology should not be envisaged as something external to, or acting upon, society. Rather, it is a socially constructed and integral part of the way in which society is organised. Technology can refer to at least three factors: first, material objects; second, the processes involved in their production; and, third, the knowledge involved in their design, production, and use. These factors inevitably involve social, economic, and political influences. Furthermore, technologies inevitably involve compromises between these competing elements. Technologies are political in that they can be designed, either explicitly or implicitly, to open some options and close others. Hence, students of technology often refer to the 'seamless web' between technology and society .
Motor sport illustrates these points very well, for the design of racing cars has been shaped over the years by many competing interest groups, not least the teams, their sponsors, the television companies, and the regulators of motor sport. The major sponsors are keen to ensure that racing is exciting but it must also be relatively safe or the publicity resulting from death or injury to drivers and/or spectators will generally have a negative impact upon the sponsor's image and commercial prospects. Sponsors are all too aware of the historic withdrawal of Mercedes Benz in 1955 after a crash which killed eighty-three spectators and there has been an increased emphasis upon enhanced safety features in motor racing in recent years owing to untimely (and unexplained) deaths. Nevertheless, the glamour associated with the speed and excitement of racing is often used by the major companies to sell their products. For example, in March 1997, Vauxhall and Texaco ran national television adverts in the United Kingdom allied to their involvement in motor sport. As one chief executive put it, "Decisions are now being made by people external to motor sport. You are not in command of your own livelihood anymore. The influences imposed upon you, which again the industry has no knowledge of, no experience of, is that motor racing is a technical billboard, and a billboard is manipulated by marketing people, and marketing people have strength" (respondent 42).
In the most extreme cases, examples exist of car designs which deliberately incorporate additional space for the sponsors' logos (see Henry, 1991) : "we want more advertising on the car-so we'll make the wings bigger and stuff" (respondent 8). These pressures get worked out also through the technical panels which regulate the various racing formulae. Some of the key innovators of the past, such as Colin Chapman, founder of Lotus, believed that there should be no basic restrictions whatsoever on racing-car design (Crombac, 1986) . However, such an approach would eventually conflict with considerations of cost, safety, and excitement. Within motor sport, the technical panels achieve a consensus about the types of cars the various teams can produce. Importantly, the technical panels include the key designers in the industry. This means that there is a very strong cooperative, as well as fiercely competitive, element in racing-car design and within the technical panels. For example, one engineer noted that "if a team asks FIA a technical question, the FIA sends a copy of the question and answer to every team" (respondent 5). Yet in competition terms this is significant also because you gain "some element of understanding of what other people are trying to do by the questions that they ask" (respondent 1). Similarly, as a member of the technical panel revealed:
(2) The numbers refer to the transcript code. All respondents were assured of anonymity to enable them to speak freely.
"I pushed very hard to get the regulations changed as much as possible every month, a bit more every month because it meant the big teams' long-term development programmes were suddenly cut short and we, as a small team, could react faster than them" (respondent 2). The collaborative nature of the industry is also revealed by the ways in which the majority of teams will group together to block a radical solution from one manufacturer if it threatens to produce cars that are much faster than all the other designs. Hence, there have been certain approaches (such as active suspension systems or turbo charging) that have been killed off, either in their infancy or at some later stage, through the regulative processes surrounding motor sport. In figure 1 we chart the evolution of one such technology, that of ground effects and 'sliding skirts', that was eventually banned in motor sport. In a real sense, then, the teams need each other, for they are not just selling individual racing cars, they are selling a spectacle to sponsors, television viewers, and spectators. Without the excitement of a close race there will be little spectacle and, in the longer run, little industry. Motor racing is therefore a social construct. It is not just about some optimal design of fast car but the creation of a form of entertainment.
The separate but related realms of science and technology Studies of the SSK tend to break down some of the distinctions between science and technology and even refer to 'technoscience' (Pinch, 1993) . For example, various physical artefacts and technology are needed to undertake scientific experiments. However, the SSK also recognises that technologies often develop with little explicit reference to scientific breakthroughs; instead they may be developed for pragmatic reasons through empirical testing and trial and error (Mackenzie and Wajcman, 1985) . Once again, the BMSI illustrates these ideas very well. Racing design has become much more 'scientific' in recent years (with the advent of information technology, wind tunnels, and so on) with much less guesswork than before. Yet although it is often thought of as highly scientific, a great deal of racing-car design is concerned with pragmatic testing. A key theme that emerged from our interviews was the sheer complexity of designing a successful racing car. Indeed, many of those interviewed likened racing-car design to a 'black art' rather than a rigorous science. Part of the reason for this is that the engineers are dealing with very complex behaviour. For example, it was argued that modelling the behaviour of a racing car is in many respects far more complex than modelling the behaviour of an aircraft. The latter usually operate in fairly stable air, high above the ground. Racing cars, in contrast, operate in highly unstable air with all the added complications of ground effects. Even the wind tunnels used by teams cannot fully replicate this complexity of effects on the race track. Because of this complexity, the testing of racing cars is an extremely difficult business and in many instances beyond the realm of sophisticated computer modelling.
"It sorts of develops from the theoretical side, but then we go to the wind tunnel and it will be, at the end of the day, trial and error, and fiddling with bits of plasticine and modelling it to get it to do something differently" (respondent 2). Furthermore, there are so many confounding variables at work-the atmosphere, tyres, driving styles-that it is not always clear why a car is behaving in the way it does. As SSK reveals, it is extremely difficult to replicate scientific experiments, even under highly controlled conditions, and it is especially difficult in the less controllable world of motor racing. As Nigel Bennett of Penske (one of the senior designers in the industry) commented, "I see up-and-coming designers reacting to what is on the screen and having a lack of ability to analyse things from a gut feel, from experience. When people had to make a lot of guesses, they gained from the experience, more so than those doing in-depth analyses who don't have to make choices. Sometimes I look at car data and I see something that doesn't make sense to me .... I say to them, 'look guys, this is wrong.' All I get is blank looks yet I know it's bad information" (quoted in Wright, 1996a, page 18) . But even if it is possible to work out the answers to these complex problems this may not be sufficient in motor sport. Often decisions have to be made very quickly in response to changing circumstances. As one engineer commented, "there are two overriding factors that will dictate one's overall performance in motor sport. First, it is not the best you can possibly do period, it is the best you can do in the time you have available. Second, it is the best you can do on the budget that you have got .... You might need tremendous understanding and a three-year research programme to figure out what happens but there is no time to do that because you are on to the next problem" (respondent 30).
The myth of the inventor 'genius' A third feature of SSK is the assertion that scientific breakthroughs and technological innovations are not primarily the result of single acts of inspiration by individuals possessed of genius but are the product of many small incremental acts by numerous people. Thus, the widely used diesel engine bears little relationship to the early sketches produced by the inventor Diesel, as hundreds of workers in the MAN company were needed to develop his ideas into working prototypes (Latour, 1987) . In motor sport there have been innovators who have been labelled 'genius'. For example, many of the postwar innovations in racing-car design-aerodynamics, ground effects-were instigated by Colin Chapman, founder of the Lotus company. Furthermore, most of the racing-car companies employ designers today, such as Adrian Newey, Patrick Head, Gordon Murray, Harvey Postlethwaite, and John Barnard, who are as well known to motor-sport enthusiasts as the drivers. However, as many of our respondents noted, racing-car construction is above all about teamwork: "Now with all these people, I can't say: 'I designed that'. It's a different pleasure, managing a large group of people, all working together, integrating them. I will understand how it all works, but some of the processes, such as finite element analysis, software development, and electronics design, I can't do myself" (Patrick Head, quoted in Wright, 1996c) . In this context it should be noted that Colin Chapman was brilliant at adopting ideas from other spheres and persuading others in his company to implement them (Crombac, 1986 ; see also figure 1).
Technological trajectories A recognition of the incremental nature of innovation is part of a further insight from SSK, which is that technologies tend to evolve along trajectories; that is, pathways in which certain options or avenues get closed down, thereby limiting the range of possible developments. Hence, there are numerous inventions that might have been more influential but their inventors could not mobilise sufficient resources for them to be more important. Consequently, the avenues which are chosen are not the optimal choice reflecting some inevitable scientific or technological logic; instead the trajectory is shaped by numerous social and economic factors. For example, it has been argued that the conventional shape of the bicycle in widespread use today was not inevitable but was the product of struggles between various competing interests, in particular the safety and speed lobbies ; see also Bijker, 1992 , on fluorescent lighting).
In this regard, students of SSK have spotted the potential of their approach to link up^ with an approach that has also influenced economic geography in recent years-the neoSchumpeterian notion of technological trajectories (Arthur, 1989; Belt and Rip, 1990; Dosi, 1984; Nelson and Winter, 1982) . Neo-Schumpeterian economics is an attempt to reject the notion of perfect rationality incorporated into neoclassical economics, according to which, at any given time, firms evaluate and adopt the most efficient technology from a wide range of possibilities. This approach assumes rapid substitutability and reversibility of investment decisions. Contrary to the neoclassical approach, Nelson and Winter (1982) argue that firms do not make optimal choices but instead develop routines for accomplishing various tasks. The result is that there are strong irreversibilities in the production process; certain technological options get closed down and product developments get stabilised into a technological regime. Often labelled evolutionary economics, this approach is similar in its thinking to another strand of 'heterodox' economics, that of institutional economics (Hodgson, 1993; Murdoch, 1995; Review of International Political Economy 1994) .
Despite the plethora of differing motor-sport formulae, there are clear technological trajectories in racing-car design. It might seem counterintuitive in this context to adopt a constructionist approach and believe that there is not some natural logic that has led to the optimal designs that we see before us on the track today. Certainly, many of those within the racing-car industry would assert that there is an inevitable, internal logic to the evolution of the racing car. There is a strong view within the industry that there is one best solution to the evolution of racing-car design and it will eventually be discovered after extensive testing. To support this argument, designers point to those features introduced in motor sport-such as the lightweight properties of carbon fibre-which are so superior that all the teams have had no choice but to adopt the approach if they are to be competitive.
For this reason innovations that seem to offer great improvements, such as aerodynamic wings, the weight-reducing qualities of carbon fibre, and raised nose profiles, are rapidly taken up throughout the industry. In contrast, those approaches that do not appear to offer advantages-such as six-wheel configurations or four-wheel drive-are rapidly rejected. To illustrate the evolution of a trajectory, figure 2 (over) shows the development and introduction of one of the most important innovations in racing-car technology in the last two decades which has survived the regulatory process-carbon composites.
As we have indicated in the previous sections, however, the idea that there is one inevitable logic to the evolution of the racing car can be broken down. First, the design of racing cars has been shaped by many different interest groups over the years. This means that certain options have been closed down or sidelined to one of the less prominent racing formulae. For example, it is a particular institutional and financial framework that permits such a concern with technological innovation in Formula One. The social construction element in motor racing is also well revealed by the growth of a new form of racing-touring cars. These cars look like commercially sold saloon cars but under the bodywork they are different in almost every respect. Although involving lower speeds than Formula One, this type of racing is growing in popularity. In other words, motor sport could be very different from the dominant forms it takes today. In the future it might involve more saloon-derived cars, or rallying on roads, or electric engines, or even perhaps solar-powered cars or some new approach yet to be 'invented' and developed. Second, any improvements in the design of a car have to be appreciated by a community of engineers. Even the most radical improvements are treated with scepticism in the early stages, and so they all need champions who can persuade their colleagues of their worth. It is not simply the case that things are so effective that they suggest themselves automatically.
The role of discourse
Crucial to the generation and dissemination of scientific and technological advances are shared sets of understandings-discourses that help to interpret the world and whose uncertain construction are encapsulated within SSK through the concepts of interpretative flexibility and social closure (see earlier). In effect, a version of truth becomes winnowed from the various interpretations that are promulgated . Ambiguities are resolved, usually for a limited period, and a technical trajectory becomes established.
These processes are well revealed in motor sport for there is, typically, considerable uncertainty in the industry about the value of a new approach. Even the most significant change in racing-car design in the post-war era-the shift to a rear engine layout-took some time to be accepted. Despite the success of the rear-engined German Auto Union cars in the interwar period, there was considerable scepticism about the new Gooper rear-engine design. This originally had a small low-powered engine and many believed that this layout would not be suitable for powerful engines.
Another example, in the last decade, was the controversy generated by the raised nose pioneered by the Benetton Formula One team. Most teams attempted to evaluate a similar front profile but there was much debate over the utility of the approach. Indeed, Ferrari took some years of testing, switching backwards and forwards between designs, before settling on a similar configuration. Such uncertainty leads to a great deal of blind copying. As one senior engineer commented, "a car might have a particular style or component which sets it out from the rest, but that may not be the reason why it is doing well, but people just blindly copy it because they think ... they must have found something, some way of measuring a gain in performance that we can't find, so we'll do it anyway" (respondent 33). Another designer graphically explained that "if painting a race car purple gives it a second a lap, I mean, next week they will all be purple" (respondent 23). The outcome of the above is designs led by strong beliefs and discourses about how cars should look and behave as well as the results of testing:
"One of the design parameters [for Pacific Formula One cars] was that the Pacific had to look like a Benetton and that was reasonable since the 1992 Benetton had been based on the Reynard Fl car" (Lawrence, 1997, page 162).
The materiality of knowledge A crucial insight implicit in the previous sections is that knowledge consists of more than dematerialised ideas. Knowledge is embedded in physical artefacts, technologies, and ways of doing things;These factors reside in scientific laboratories, research centres, and factories. However, this does not imply the 'disembodied' view of knowledgethat knowledge consists simply of machinery which can easily be transported-as the role of human capital is crucial. Thus, scientific experiments and technical innovations are often dependent upon tacit knowledge-accepted ways of doing things that are seldom written down (Gertler, 1995; Polyani, 1967) . These forms of knowledge often emerge from sets of people who have undertaken long periods of apprenticeship and are integrated into networks of contacts. For this reason, early scientific experiments are often difficult to replicate in other laboratories. There are so many detailed sets of understandings involved in the formulation of the experiment or in the construction of technological artefacts that not all of these can be incorporated by people attempting replication. Law and Lodge (1984) provide an excellent example of this in the form of a new laser. Despite extensive descriptions of the laser in the scientific literature, it was only after personnel from the Canadian laboratory in which the initial model was built visited other laboratories that the laser experiment could be replicated. This embodied nature of knowledge in the BMSI was a theme that emerged on numerous occasions in our interviews. One example was a claim by a designer that although some of the important machine tools of the industry were produced in another country, "They manufacture the tool but they don't know how to use it for that particular use" (respondent 35). Other examples were related to the continued buying-in of British personnel and expertise by companies located overseas: "They [the Italians and French] take people out of the system. OK they get the knowledge up to date but they don't get the next stage and the next stage" (respondent 7). "...you give them a gem of information and it sort of lies discarded on the floor because 'there are none so blind as those that cannot see'... they didn't know they had that problem" (respondent 7).
"We are trying to educate them about the English way of doing things" (respondent 11).
In summary, the social constructionist approach provides a particular route for understanding technological innovation. With regard to the world of technological innovation, it provides a particular insight in its recognition that the discursive is intimately bound up with the material. As highlighted by the final aspect of SSK (discussed above), the social constructionist approach is revealing in its increasing recognition of the role of space in the construction of knowledge, and with it technoeconomic paradigms, technological trajectories, regimes, and the like. Especially interesting, in an apparent age of globalisation and time -space compression driven by technological advances, are the implications the approach holds for understanding the process of knowledge generation as a process deeply embedded in ways of doing things in particular places (Hinchcliffe, 1996; Latour, 1987; Law, 1986; Murdoch, 1995; .
A discursive approach to understanding new industrial spaces
The potential of a discursive approach such as that of SSK and its most recent hybrid, actor network theory (ANT), has not been lost on a number of geographers and regional analysts who seek to explain economic change in recent years (Hinchcliffe, 1996; Murdoch, 1995; Thrift and Olds, 1996) . For example, Thrift (1994) uses insights from the approach to explain the continuing success of the City of London as a centre for international finance. He notes that, as money has increased in volume and has progressively dematerialised, so the potential for discursive interpretation of the changes in money markets has increased. The numerous firms in the financial sector have therefore become centres of representation and discursive authority in order to interpret the huge volume of information with which they are bombarded. The extensive social networks of dealers and traders, which are forged and sustained through common social backgrounds, help to create a consensus about the meanings behind the numerous signals in the market place which determine financial outcomes and financial innovations. Storper (1995) has also noted the potential of a discursive approach in the context of new industrial spaces. He highlights the inadequacy of many existing theories of agglomeration which are based on the transfer of physical inputs and outputs. This includes the highly influential 'Early Californian' approach which interpreted agglomeration as an attempt to minimise the transaction costs associated with interfirm linkage.
By drawing upon and extending the work of the evolutionary economists, Storper argues that a more effective approach to the enigma of regional concentration may lie in the notion of untraded interdependencies. These consist of various methods and practices whereby firms are able to obtain knowledge of the technological trajectory of the ifflmffy ofwhichTthey are partTThe crucial poihOTIhat thisTcnowledge is bfteiT obtained through informal untraded means. Nevertheless, this knowledge is crucial to ensure the survival of the firm and it involves not just knowledge of technology but all aspects of the organisation of production (Storper, 1995) . In effect, this knowledge helps shape the 'local world of production' of the firm (Storper and Salais, 1997) .
Other influential strands of thought which recognise the importance of knowledge in localised production systems are encapsulated in the concepts of 'learning regions' (Morgan, 1997) , 'institutional thickness' (Amin and Thrift, 1992) , 'regional innovation systems' (Asheim and Isaksen, 1997) , and 'reflexive accumulation ' (Lash and Urry, 1994) , to name but a few. Whatever the label, all of the above perspectives are part of a broader conceptual shift in economic geography which recognises the socially embedded character of production systems (and an enhanced recognition of the cultural and discursive aspects of production systems) and the crucial importance of knowledge in modern economies.
Yet for all these new theorisations, and as Storper (1995) notes, we are still remarkably ignorant about the (cultural) processes that lead to such agglomerations. It is as a contribution to this debate that we use the insights of SSK to analyse the localised production system of Motor Sport Valley. In essence, our conclusion is that the BMSI is best viewed as a 'community of knowledge' which has kept ahead of the rest of the world through its ability to generate and disseminate knowledge about superior ways of designing racing cars (see Henry, 1997; Henry and Pinch, forthcoming; Pinch et al, 1997) . To read back from this conclusion provides vital insights into the reasons for both the formation and the maintenance of the supremacy of Motor Sport Valley. In addition, it provides one answer to a burning question being asked about the future of this regional agglomeration and its continued competitive advantage in the face of increasing global competition and opportunities.
Explaining the origins and continuing dominance of Motor Sport Valley: an SSK approach A focus upon knowledge provides a counter to what might be described as the 'orthodox' economic explanation that has been applied to the agglomeration of the BMSI (Aston and Williams, 1996) . This orthodox explanation has been derived from the recent work of Krugman (1990; on industrial agglomerations and consists of two basic elements. First, there is the idea that industrial agglomerations emerge for essentially accidental reasons. Second, there is the idea that after these industries become established they develop an advantage because of the growth of external economies of scale. According to Krugman, therefore, countries do not so much specialise in what they are good at but instead are good at what they specialise in (Martin and Sunley, 1996) .
In accordance with Krugman's approach, Aston and Williams (1996) cite a number of accidental factors which they argue were responsible for the growth of the BMSI including the withdrawal of Mercedes from racing following a serious crash which injured spectators at Le Mans in 1955; the shift of motor racing from roads to designated circuits; the surplus of disused airfields in Britain after World War 2, which encouraged a dense network of local club racing in Britain; the fact that continental European racing car manufacturers would build vehicles for their own teams whereas in their early days the British manufacturers would build a chassis for anyone who would buy one; and the ban on cigarette advertising on television which led to the tobacco manufacturers sponsoring racing-car teams to give their products visibility.
Their argument continues that, once the British firms started, they gained an advantage through the development of external scale economies in the dense network of specialist suppliers that grew up to service the British industry.
To think through the role of knowledge generates somewhat different insights into the origins of Motor Sport Valley than this Krugman-based explanation (see Pinch and Henry, 1997) . Studies of other industries indicate that when technologies display rapid and radical change, a 'window of opportunity' is opened up for the relocation of the industry supporting the technology. This is what happened in the case of electronics with the shift from valves to transistors and then to semiconductors (Dosi, 1984; Scott and Storper, 1987; Storper, 1995) .
(3) The reason why relocation of manufacturing capacity is possible is that new chains of inputs are required to facilitate the new technology. These inputs include new forms of knowledge and new artefacts which encapsulate this knowledge. The BMSI provides a classic case of such a locational shift associated with a new technological trajectory.
In the interwar period no totally British-designed and British-built racing car competed in a Grand Prix in Europe (Hebb, 1993) , and in the early 1950s motor racing was still dominated by continental European manufacturers. The continental European racers relied upon heavy, front-engined racing cars. Ferrari, for example, believed that if you created a powerful engine, the rest of the car would fall into place (Yates, 1991) . However, the numerous, small, British-based constructors that emerged in the late 1950s and early 1960s used a radically different, and highly successful, approach derived largely from the aerospace industry. This new approach (an aerospace-inspired technological trajectory) relied upon lightweight aluminium engines, rear-engined configurations, lightweight new materials, and designs influenced by aerodynamics. Britain had a relatively large aircraft industry given its population size, and had many skilled personnel and manufacturing companies which could provide the knowledge and the components needed. The ultimate result of this shift in technological trajectory was that the locus of the industry shifted away very rapidly from northern Italy to southern England.
A key implication of this knowledge-based perspective is that the BMSI did not come about just by accident. This does not mean that contingent factors such as the availability of airfields were not important, or that the industry was deliberately planned. Nevertheless, as Hebb (1993) notes, the origins of the industry can be traced back to the enormous investment in the aviation industry directed by the Air Ministry in the 1920s and 1930s. This created the research facilities such as the Royal Aircraft Establishment at Farnborough and generously supported aeronautical departments in universities such as at Imperial College, London (see figure 1 for an example) . By the mid-1950s over 16% of Britain's qualified scientists and engineers were engaged in research and development in the aviation sector (Hebb, 1993) . Significantly, many of the leading designers and engineers that were to prove crucial in the development of the BMSI, such as Mike Costin and Robin Herd, were originally trained in aviation. In table 1 we provide evidence on this point with a sample of key workers in the motorsport industry and their aviation links. Many other shop-floor workers have also been recruited into motor sport from aerospace.
We provide further evidence of the aerospace-inspired technological trajectory in table 2 (over) by noting the main aviation spin-off innovations in Formula One in the postwar era. It is apparent also that automotive-inspired innovations are much less significant. As one commentator has put it, "Creating a high performance Formula (3) Similarly, the development of the electric car is taking place in southern California because of the greater availability of knowledge of electronics in this region compared with the traditional centres of automobile manufacture in the USA, centred around Detroit (Slifko and Rigby, 1995) . One car is more akin to creating fighter aircraft than any sort of road-going machine" (Howard, 1992) . A knowledge-based approach is also important in accounting for the maintenance of the BMSI as well as its origins. This does not imply that the economies of scale argument is totally redundant. Economies of scale are factors that cause the average cost of a commodity to fall as the amount of the commodity produced increases. External scale economies apply when the industry to which the firm belongs to is large (rather than the individual firm). These external economies operate through the development of specialist suppliers of skilled labour and the development of specialist component suppliers. There is little doubt that the supremacy of the BMSI is sustained in large measures by the dense network of specialist racing-car companies in and around Motor Sport Valley. These include relatively famous companies such as AP Racing of Coventry and XTrac of Wokingham, suppliers of, respectively, clutches and gearboxes to the majority of Formula One racing teams. It also includes the myriad smaller companies that undertake specialist tasks such as heat treatment, often at very short notice. Hence, there are numerous lorries making deliveries between the specialist companies and the racing-car assemblers. As many of our respondents noted, geographical proximity is of great help in this context. However, the external economies explanation is not a fully fledged explanation for the continuing dominance of the BMSI for three main reasons. First, the early small British racing-car manufacturers developed before the current dense web of specialist suppliers. Certainly the early teams were helped by many small engineering shops, but these were fairly widespread throughout the UK. The current external economies of scale to be found in the motor-sport industry are therefore as much a consequence as a cause of the success of the sector.
(4) Second, a large proportion of the components come from outside of what is termed Motor Sport Valley. For example, France has made a substantial contribution to racing-car engines through the Renault and Peugeot companies. The third and final argument against the economies of scale approach, as some of our respondents in component suppliers pointed out, is that in many of the racing-car formulae they are not competing on the basis of cost. Through their relatively generous sponsorship deals, many of the most successful racing-car companies have extensive development budgets. Indeed, one of our respondents claimed that he was not aware (4) The general thrust of this argument has been developed by Storper and Walker (1989) under their rubric of 'geographical industrialisation'.
of any restrictions to his development budget-whenever he wanted extra money it always became available! The important point is that the leading racing-car companies above all want to win and will pay for the best components. It is therefore the skilled expertise of the suppliers rather than cost considerations that accounts for their success.
The future of Motor Sport Valley These initial insights on Motor Sport Valley gained from a knowledge-based analysis have important implications for the BMSI. It is sometimes claimed that if the dominance of a region is based largely upon knowledge, then it will be easy to shift that expertise to some other area. Thus, it has been asserted that, if it really wanted to, the capital-rich US auto industry could buy out the relatively small UK industry and ship it lock, stock, and barrel to California (Coleman, 1995) . From the perspective put forward in this paper, however, the 'disembodied' view (that knowledge consists of highly transferable nonmaterial ideas) is highly simplistic. As we have argued above, the knowledge encapsulated in the BMSI is bound up in particular people, objects, and ways of manufacturing them. It involves huge amounts of tacit knowledge and ways of doing things in a particular place and as such is unlikely to be easily transportable. Similarly, there has been talk in some circles recently about transferring the production of racing cars to Malaysia, to take account of cheaper labour costs and the booming local market for racing cars. Significantly, such proposals envisage maintaining design capacity in the United Kingdom but, in addition, this may well be underestimating the (knowledgeladen)production process in this fast-moving industry.
In contrast, the discursive approach suggests that a shift in the location of the BMSI (or rather its loss of preeminence) is most likely to come about through the introduction of a radically new approach or major change in the technological trajectory. Given the role of the region in formulating the evolution of the trajectory, this looks unlikely at present. For example, one aspect of change might be some major shift in the regulatory regime governing the major formulae in motor sport. This would have to be something radical, such as changes in the cost structure or the technologies that are permitted, and would have to be to the significant detriment of British-based constructors/However, as a discursive approach highlights, it is precisely these constructors who are integrally involved in the regulatory construction of the industry and its technological trajectory. 
Conclusions
The challenge to understand the territorialised nature of production complexes has proved to be great for regional theorists and urban planners. Despite much research, there still remains something elusive and enigmatic about the processes that sustain localisation of firms. Thus, attempts to stimulate 'technopolises' have proved to be difficult as it is clear they involve much more than the physical provision of information technology networks (Simmie, 1997) .
In this paper we have attempted to show how insights from the sociology of scientific knowledge can throw light upon the enigma of the territorialisation of production. Using the example of the BMSI, we have argued that both the origins and the continuation of this industrial agglomeration can be explained by an approach which focuses upon the discursive aspects of knowledge production. The supremacy of Motor Sport Valley did not come about by accident and it is not simply the result of continuing external economies of scale. Above all, it has been the sustained ability (5) The skill base of the industry is likely to be an important factor in this context. For example, Glasmeier has shown how the Swiss watch industry was able to meet the challenge of a radical change in the technological trajectory of watch construction (involving a shift from mechanical to quartz electronic designs) because of the depth of skills in Switzerland (Glasmeier, 1991) . of the British-based constructors to generate and disseminate knowledge that has been the key to the success of the region. (6) The British-based companies have been able to shape the regulatory environment and discourses surrounding motor sport to harness a range of 'technologies' to build 'faster' racing cars. There is not some natural, inevitable logic to the evolution of the racing car-it is a socially constructed outcome of a socially embedded knowledge community.
In this paper, and drawing on SSK, we have stressed the social influences upon the formulation of the rules and constraints within which innovation takes place. Above all, we have indicated how the material artefacts of the world have been apprehended and manipulated through particular theoretical frameworks that are formulated by a community of knowledge. One of the big issues raised by work on the sociology of scientific knowledge and technology is that if social relations affect machines, and machines affect social relations, which direction of causality is most important (contrast Woolgar, 1991, and Pinch, 1993) ? Most work has stressed the social influences upon the development of technology but Latour and his ANT associates give many examples of the reverse pattern of influence (and ultimately argue for the falsity of this dualism). In the case of motor racing, and especially in the most sophisticated forms of the sport, such as Formula One, in which the emphasis is upon technological innovation, it is easy to conceptualise developments as 'technically driven'. Hence, the 'laws' of aerodynamics and the weightsaving effects of carbon fibre have had a profound effect upon the shape of racing cars. Within this paper there has only been room to deal with the social constructionist view of technological innovation and the insights it can provide into territorialised production. Although this approach recognises that the material and the discursive elements of technological innovation are inextricably interwoven, with connections simultaneously flowing in both directions, its particular vision of materiality (for example, artefacts) is a source of criticism from proponents of ANT. We aim to investigate this further in a future paper as part of a continued project to draw on the insights of SSK in all its forms as a route to understanding the persistence of localised production.
